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The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA) and its amendments and related
legislation currently require that applicants for reg-
istration or reregistration of a pesticide demon-
strate to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that there is not “any unreasonable
risk to manor the environment, taking into account
the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of use of the pesticide. ” Present benefit
evaluation guidelines call for consideration of ef-
fects on users, nonusers, consumers, GNP, and
employment, Minimum guidelines call for a partial
budgeting analysis and, if output effects of elimi-
nating the pesticide appear large, a more sophisti-
cated analysis using neoclassical multimarket eco-
nomic-surplus concepts.
Risk considerations for registration or cancella-
tion can typically be divided into the scientific dis-
ciplines of residue chemistry, environmental fate,
ecological effects, nondietary exposure (occupa-
tional and residential exposure), and toxicology. A
conservative bias in estimating risks is widely ac-
knowledged. Indirect health risks, such as in-
creased dietary risks resulting from higher food
prices, are not considered in the risk analysis.
Risks and benefits are analyzed independently, and
risks are given in nonmonetary terms, while im-
pacts on user benefits (and costs) and impacts on
consumers, taxpayers, producers who do not use
the pesticide in question, and other sectors of the
economy are usually stated in monetary terms.
The EPA Administrator (or a designated Assis-
tant Administrator) is delegated responsibility of
judging whether risks to man and/or the environ-
ment are outweighed by benefits. According to
pesticide legislation and relevant court rulings,
pesticide decisions must err on the side of public
safety. The Delaney Amendment (to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act), which calls for “zero
risk,” also adds legal confusion to the registration
and cancellation processes. Applicability of this
C. Robert Taylor is Alfa Eminent Scholar, Department of Agricultural
Economics and Rural Sociology, Auburn University.
amendment to pesticides and the definition of ex-
actly what constitutes zero risk seem to be a never-
-endinglegal/scientific/economic debate. A recent
court decision has directed the EPA to enforce the
“zero risk” mandate under the Delaney Clause, in
conflict with FIFRA, Water-quality legislation
also overlaps pesticide legislation.
Several issues pertaining to the benefit evalua-
tion connected with pesticide registration/
reregistration/cancellation and issues pertaining to
weighing risks and benefits are discussed in this
article. My intent is to stimulate discussion on
these issues, particularly to see if major thrusts of
theoretical and empirical research in economics
and agricultural economics match up with the is-
sues. I will restrict my remarks to evaluation under
existing legislation, because a companion article
by Lichtenberg addresses broader pesticide policy
issues. I begin with further presentation of my
view of the benefit component of current assess-
ments needed for registration or reregistration of a
pesticide. My discussion is in the context of agri-
cultural use of pesticides, but most of the discus-
sion also applies to nonagricultural uses of pesti-
cides (25% of total use), which are also regulated
by FIFRA.
Current Benefit Assessment
Benefit assessment, as typically practiced, can be
thought of as a two-step procedure. The first step is
estimation of direct impacts on pesticide users in
terms of per acre yields and productions costs (to
use a crop pesticide for illustration), while the sec-
ond step involves partial budgeting and sometimes
economic-surplus analyses.
Implicit in yield and cost estimates are assump-
tions about what alternative pesticides, if any, pro-
ducers would use. How production practices
would change in response to the decision is also
estimated. Estimates are presumably made on the
basis of all available information, including exper-
imental, field, laboratory, demonstration plot, and
Delphi panel data obtained from manufacturers,72 October 1992
universities, and state and federal agencies. Since
there is no formal way of combining quite diverse
data, considerable judgment is used in obtaining
yield and cost estimates. For many pesticide deci-
sions, yield and cost estimates are separately pro-
vided by the chemical manufacturer, the EPA, and
the USDA. Uncertainty in estimating direct pro-
duction impacts on users is well recognized and is
usually highlighted by considerable differences be-
tween, for example, EPA estimates and manufac-
turer’s estimates of yield and cost effects. Since
yield and cost estimates are drawn from the same
body of information, differences in estimates can
often be attributed to differences in projections
about alternative practices and pesticides, and to
difficulties in extrapolating from limited experi-
mental and field data to effects on the average
user.
Given estimates of yield and cost effects, EPA
guidelines call, at a minimum, for a partial budget-
ing approach to determine effects on pesticide us-
ers. Where effects appear large enough to affect
prices of commodities produced with the pesticide
in question, guidelines further require that the
analysis be extended to include consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses, indirect taxpayer expense (via
farm programs), and finally the classical net wel-
fare triangle. An illustration of multimarket sur-
plus evaluation of possible regulato~ options can
be found in Taylor, Penson, Smith, and Knutson.
Guidelines appropriately caution use of large-scale
econometric or programming models for aggregate
surplus evaluation because results from different
models are not always consistent. Use of different
economic models, such as interregional linear pro-
gramming versus econometric simulation, to eval-
uate the aggregate economic consequences of
given cost and yield effects adds considerably to
the confusion and uncertainty surrounding regis-
tration and cancellation decisions.
Economic effects are an integral part of FIFRA
legislation, but are relegated second priority to
risk. Economic effects of EPA decisions on the
pesticide industry are not considered in risldbenefit
decisions, as mandated by FIFRA, Where prelim-
inary economic analysis indicates that the regula-
tion might have a significant effect on agricultural
production and thus on prices, the analysis is ex-
tended to effects on consumers, producers who are
nonusers, taxpayers, and GNP. Both the EPA and
USDA/ERS have provided multimarket economic-
surplus evaluations as input into regulatory and
cancellation decisions for several pesticides.
The way in which the EPA Administrator or
designated decision maker handles the immense
uncertainty about risk factors, widely divergent
benefit estimates, media hype, politics, and con-
flicting federal guidelines and legislation is not ap-
parent from decisions.
Issues
With this as background about evaluation and de-
cision making for registration or re-registration of
a pesticide under present legislation, I would like
to turn to several broad economic evaluation is-
sues.
Issues are: (1) Can economics contribute di-
rectly to better decisions by providing a formal
framework or methodology for weighing risks and
benefits, rather than relying on judgment of an
EPA Administrator; (2) Should evaluations and
policy be based on perceptions of reality or on
reality as judged by science; (3) Is risldbenefit
analysis socially optimal; (4) Is it better to analyze
each pesticide separately, allowing for the possi-
bility of later reevaluation, or should we analyze
various combinations of pesticide regulatory pos-
sibilities; (5) How can we improve incorporation
of dynamics into benefit evaluation; and (6) How
can we best handle uncertainty about risks and
benefits? This is by no means a complete list of
relevant issues, but time and other constraints im-
posed by a symposium dictate that the list be kept
manageable.
What Is the Appropriate Methodology for
Weighing Risks and Benejlts?
When I first became involved in aggregate eco-
nomic evaluation of pesticide issues, discussions
seemed to be dominated by noneconomists esti-
mating “pest losses” as percentage yield loss
times acreage times price, which is the value of
losses not allowing for supply and demand adjust-
ments that would undoubtedly occur without pest
losses. This figure was sometimes inflated by add-
ing producers’ expenditures to control the pests in
question. Such a calculation, which produced in-
credibly large and impressive economic-impact
numbers, obviously has no relevance to welfare
economics or to decision making.
Incorporation of evaluation concepts like eco-
nomic surplus from neoclassical welfare econom-
ics into mid- 1970s guidelines for pesticide regis-
tration represented a dramatic improvement in the
quality and relevance of economic information
provided as input into pesticide policy decisions.
Extensions of neoclassical models to decision
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petted utility maximization model) to pesticide
policy decisions have not met with success, per-
haps because of the difficulty of monetizing risk to
man and the environment. Thus, from a broad
viewpoint of risks and benefits, very incomplete
“economic trade-off” estimates are presented to
pesticide decision makers. Of course, considering
the cost of information, it may be appropriate to
settle for incomplete information, especially where
effects appear small.
The neoclassical model of behavior, extended to
risk and to social welfare, is based on several as-
sumptions that seem to me to be especially inap-
propriate to social decision making in the case of
pesticides. First, there is the notion of the coldly
calculating, expected utility (EU) maximizing con-
sumer with perfect information. Although disci-
plines such as sociology and psychology have long
dismissed this model, many economists seem to
use it with religious zeal. Further discussion of this
issue can be found in Shoemaker, MacCrimmon
and Larson, Boland (1981, 1983), Burks, Cald-
well, De Alessi, and Buschena and Zilberman.
The mean-variance (EV) model, which seems to
have occupied the fancy of our profession for two
decades, is not applicable to analyzing pesticide
regulatory issues because strongly skewed proba-
bility distributions (on the risk side of the ledger)
deviate substantially from the assumption of nor-
mally distributed random variables necessary to
make the EV model a good approximation to the
EU model. Appealing to certainty equivalence for
monetizing risks, as called for in general Executive
Order guidelines for Regulatory Impact Analysis,
would appear to result in substantial bias because
of highly skewed probability distributions that
clearly violate the certainty-equivalent (Simon,
Theil) requirements.
Another difficulty involved with applying the
classical EU model is that many pesticide policy
issues involve cases for which it is impossible to
assign “objective” probabilities to risk factors
and, furthermore, for which it is quite difficult, if
not impossible, to even assign “subjective” prob-
abilities. Thus, even the safety-first model, which
has intuitive appeal for this problem, is not oper-
ational when probabilities cannot be assigned.
Along with assuming maximization, the EU
model is also based on the assumption that the
representative consumer believes in the classical
notion of probability and that the probability of all
possible states of nature can be assigned, at least
subjectively. Although not well advertised, there
are challenges to the classical notion of probability
(see, for example, Burks) that together with
challenges to the maximization hypothesis, cast
some doubt on the validity of the EU model.
Building on the utility maximization model,
neoclassical welfare economics assumes that util-
ity functions are independent, perhaps because as-
suming otherwise makes the neoclassical social
welfare model intractable, except in special cases.
I believe that most people, by introspection, will
see that the independence assumption is not appro-
priate. A few deaths or terminal illnesses out of
250 million people in the U.S. does not seem like
many or seem to impose a large social cost (com-
pared to other risks and causes of death), unless, of
course, the death occurs to a friend or family mem-
ber. Likewise, negative risk factors do not affect
just producers or applicators, but also family,
friends, and the immediate social community.
Thus, to the extent that utility functions are irtter-
dependent, the notion of consumers’ surplus ob-
tained by adding surplus for all individuals is not a
valid measure of welfare effects.
Viewed at the individual rather than aggregate
level, pesticide policy trade-offs often involve in-
finitesimal (but nonzero) risk versus infinitesimal
benefits for most people, and small to significant
risk versus large benefits and costs for users.
Viewed at the aggregate level, pesticide registra-
tion decisions often involve comparing a few ex-
pected deaths or development of a few cancers to
hundreds of millions of dollars of benefits.
The main point of this rather lengthy diatribe is
that neoclassical expected utility maximization and
welfare economics based on this concept and as-
sociated assumptions may not have much rele-
vance to pesticide policy decisions. Rather than the
profession spending tremendous resources on, for
example, trying to estimate surplus changes using
compensated rather than ordinary demand curves,
or on using the latest static, deterministic duality
model applied to a stochastic, dynamic problem,
perhaps we should redirect our efforts and thinking
toward new theoretical models that might give
more insight into pesticide regulatory decisions.
Using production economics terminology, one
could politely say that the profession seems to be
well off of the expansion path. (Or, given our cur-
rent research funding environment, should we call
it the “contraction” path?)
Only with more realistic theoretical models, I
think, can we provide a framework or method that
will assist pesticide policy makers with weighing
risks and benefits. Thus, research on how people
actually perceive risk and on how they balance
infinitesimal, but otherwise unknown, probabili-
ties of catastrophes with more easily assigned ben-74 October 1992 NJARE
efits might prove enlightening. Additional research
on how we can aggregate preferences to account
for interdependent values also seems warranted.
Base Evaluations on Perceptions of Reality or
Reality as Measured by Science?
Public discussion of pesticide policy is typically
charged with so much emotion, media hype, and
fear of any chemical with a big name that one can
make the case that legislation is based partly on
risk’ ‘perceptions” that often do not match up with
reality. Yet, risk assessments done as input into the
registration process appear to be based on “real”
risks, to the extent that science can measure risk.
Recent controversy about the chemical Alar
used on apples illustrates the reality versus percep-
tion problem. Benefit evaluation based on eco-
nomic factors before, during, and after the 1988
media hype about dangers of Alar would, because
of effects of the hype on demand and baseline
prices, give different estimates of benefits. Which
should be used?
The public seems to be uninformed or poorly
informed about both risk and benefit consequences
of pesticide use and regulatory action. Consumers
rarely have good information on the food price and
quality effects connected to pesticide use; simi-
larly, because of the complexities of pest manage-
ment, including 1PM, producers may not have
good information on how a proposed pesticide reg-
ulatory action would influence farm income. En-
vironmentalists, all of whom seem to believe in the
law of ecology that “everything is connected to
everything else, ” do not often seem to acknowl-
edge that this law also applies to the economy and
that there are environmental trade-offs as well as
economic trade-offs. The issue is greatly compli-
cated by the lack of trust that now exists in society,
especially trust of university professors!
Lack of understanding and not knowing who to
believe about pesticide issues makes meaningful
public discussion of pesticide issues quite difficult,
And, because most people are only affected infin-
itesimally, the transaction costs (De Alessi) needed
to sort through the complexities far exceed indi-
vidual benefits; thus, public debate seems doomed
to media hype, claims, and counterclaims that are
based on very few facts.
I think that we need to give more thought to
whether we should base economic analysis on per-
ceptions of reality (with respect to risk and to eco-
nomic effects) or on reality (as judged or defined
by what we now call science).
Is Risk/Benefit Analysis Socially Optimal?
Although a full cost accounting is not practical for
purposes of this article, a rough measure of ex-
penses connected with meeting federal mandates is
useful. Annual expenses for benefit assessment by
the USDA and EPA are in the $5 million to
$10 million range, while pesticide risk assessments
would appear to be in the $50 million to
$100 million range, annually. EPA registration-
related R&D expenditures by pesticide firms are in
the range of $250 million annually (Aspelin,
Grube, and Kibler, p. 11). Thus, a rough estimate
of annual direct private and government expendi-
tures connected with risldbenefit assessment would
be $300 million to $500 million. On a per capita
basis, the direct cost of risldbenefit assessment is
thus less than $2 annually.
From a simple perspective, annual expenditures
of less than $2 per capita appear to be cheap “in-
surance” compared to risks to man and the envi-
ronment that might be abated by the policy. How-
ever, there are more complex issues of(1) whether
the registration process poses barriers to develop-
ment of new pesticides (especially minor-use pes-
ticides), (2) whether existing expenditures were
optimally allocated to assessment of risks and ben-
efits, and optimally allocated to different pesti-
cides under consideration, and (3) whether other
policy instruments (Lichtenberg) would better
achieve social goals,
Expenditures attributable to EPA requirements
for a manufacturer to register a pesticide are ap-
proximately the same for minor- and major-use
pesticides. For the industry as a whole, EPA reg-
istration-related expenditures by pesticide firms
account for only about 20% of total R&D expen-
ditures, and total only about 3% of pesticide sales.
On average, therefore, registration expenses do not
seem high. However, registration expenses are
about the same for major pesticides as for specialty
and minor-use pesticides. Thus, for highly special-
ized or target-specific pesticides with low antici-
pated sales, manufacturers will not find it profit-
able to register minor-use pesticides or will not
find it profitable to try to develop new minor-use
pesticides. Although not often acknowledged, reg-
istration barriers can also increase benefits because
fewer alternatives will be on the market and, with
imperfectly competitive markets, will increase the
price that a manufacturer will receive. Benefits to
an individual pesticide can be increased because
barriers keep potential alternatives off the market.
Definitive empirical analysis of these issues is not
possible because of inadequate data.
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ing with extensive and quite expensive risldbenefit
assessment with minor-use registration. Whether
recent statements by the EPA is just lip service, or
whether they will make substantive changes, re-
mains to be seen.
One-by-One Evaluation?
Current legislation leads to evaluation of chemicals
on a one-by-one basis, which is a problem that has
been well recognized by the EPA, USDA, and
many individuals and organizations for two de-
cades; however, there has been little change in
legislation or evaluation practices. The problem
with registering pesticides on a case-by-case basis
is that there may be insignificant benefits to the
first pesticide (in a particular use class) evaluated
because there are several alternatives on the mar-
ket. Proceeding sequentially, there are fewer and
fewer alternatives on the market, until there is only
one pesticide left for registration consideration.
Because this is the onIy pesticide left, benefits of
use may outweigh risks, even though this pesticide
is less efficacious and much more toxic than those
that were previously banned.
The obvious way around this is to simulta-
neously evaluate combinations of pesticides. How-
ever, with this approach, there may be an unwork-
able number of alternatives, and staff requirements
for simultaneously evaluating so many combina-
tions may be suboptimal. The EPA appears to be
moving in the direction of evaluating a few com-
binations of pesticides, rather than relying exclu-
sively on the sequential decisions on single pesti-
cides, and may thus be striking a good balance.
How Can We Best Account for Dynamics and
Induced Technological Change?
There are a variety of issues that one can place
under a generic heading called dynamics that need
to be addressed. One dynamic issue is how to mea-
sure the buildup of pesticide resistance that would
likely occur with future use of the pesticide. That
resistance buildup occurs is well documented in
many cases, but how to project future resistance is
extremely difficult because the genetic mechanism
responsible for resistance in a particular species is
often highly complex and difficult to pinpoint
(Hueth and Regev, Taylor and Headley).
A second dynamic issue is how to predict dif-
ferential induced technological change that might
occur if use of the pesticide were restricted. Re-
moving a pesticide from use often increases output
price and may increase the price of alternative con-
trol methods, both of which combine to increase
the incentive to develop alternative chemical and
nonchemical means of control. That we should
consider induced technological change is apparent
to most economists, but how to quantify such well
enough for aggregate evaluation is not clear.
A third dynamic issue pertains to the discount-
ing of future benefits and costs, and, with long
time horizons, intergenerational welfare compari-
sons. At the present time, the EPA is pressured by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
use a real discount rate of about 10%, which places
virtually no present value on some of the possible
future consequences of pesticide use.
How to Incorporate Tremendous Uncertainty
about Risk and Uncertainty into Decisions ?
Uncertainty about risk factors, and even uncer-
tainty about benefits of pesticides, is a striking and
pervasive feature of pesticide regulatory decisions.
Assessment of risks to man and the environment,
and establishment of acceptable tolerances or stan-
dards is, ironically, based more on guesswork or
art than on cold, hard science. Worded another
way, risk assessment is on the frontiers of what we
call science.
For example, using the same data set on the
human health threat posed by dioxins and using
practically the same quantitative model, scientists
from three federal agencies (CDC, EPA, and
FDA) made risk estimates that varied by an order
of magnitude (Executive Office of the President,
p, 21), (And we thought this problem arose only
with econometric analysis of time-series data!).
The lack of scientific agreement on what con-
stitutes risk contributes to the confusion surround-
ing pesticide regulation. The EPA Administrator
typically must make regulatory decisions on the
basis of widely varying and even contradictory es-
timates of risks and of benefits. Combining the
worst-case estimate with the best-case benefit es-
timate might lead to a decision to deny registration
for many pesticides, while combining the best-case
risk estimate with the worst-case benefit estimate
might lead to a decision to allow unrestricted use
of all pesticides. I sense that there is a tendency to
assume that conflicting risk or benefit estimates
$‘bracket” the likely outcomes and, further, that
the truth is midway between the worst-case and
best-case information presented to EPA decision
makers. This tendency should be investigated, in
my opinion.
Transaction costs and other factors (such as
knowing how the system works) may lead to an
imbalance set of information on which decisions
are based; that is, transaction costs keep parties76 October 1992 NJARE
that would bear infinitesimal (but nonzero) eco-
nomic costs and benefits (but, importantly, which
might aggregate to significant benefits or costs)
from conducting thorough studies of the proposed
regulatory action. Thus, the information set given
to the EPA Administrator may favor large impacts,
positive or negative, or favor those groups for
which transaction costs are low,
More fundamentally, I don’t think decision the-
ory or the neoclassical expected utility maximiza-
tion theory provides a solid methodological frame-
work for fine-tuning decisions in the face of con-
siderable uncertainty about risks to man and the
environment, and about benefits and costs to users
and food consumers. Given weakness in our theo-
retical decision models, are we better off relying
on inadequacies of the current system that is un-
doubtedly influenced by politics and the judgment
of a few individuals, or relying on admittedly in-
adequate theoretical and empirical models?
Conclusions
Just two decades ago, many discussions of pesti-
cide “benefits” were dominated by erroneous cal-
culations, such as implying that the value of pes-
ticides was losses avoided, computed as price
times yield loss times acreage. Now, benefit cal-
culations are increasingly based on neoclassical
concepts of economic surpluses to producers and
consumers, and on consideration of multimarket
effects of regulatory decisions. Thus, the quality of
economic information submitted to decision mak-
ers has improved considerably over the last two or
three decades; however, it is not clear that such
economic information is actually a serious consid-
eration relative to risks to man and the environ-
ment in pesticide regulatory decisions.
Many pesticide regulatory decision options are
characterized by infinitesimal, but otherwise un-
known, probabilities of risk to man and the envi-
ronment that must be weighed against sometimes
large benefits to users and infinitesimal, but non-
zero, benefits and costs (via induced price effects)
to consumers of products produced with the chem-
icals. Decisions often involve irreversibilities, in-
tergenerational transfer of risks and benefits, dis-
tribution consequences, and tremendous uncer-
tainty about risks to man and the environment. The
challenge to the economics profession, in my opin-
ion, is to develop theoretical models and empirical
estimates that shed more light on pesticide decision
making than does the neoclassical expected utility
maximizing consumer and the welfare economics
based on this model.
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